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Abstract
Traffic navigation services have gained widespread adoption in recent years. The
route recommendations generated by these services often leads to severe congestion
on urban streets, raising concerns from neighboring residents and city authorities.
This paper is motivated by the question: How can a transportation authority design
an information structure to induce a preferred equilibrium traffic flow pattern in
uncertain network state conditions? We approach this question from a Bayesian
persuasion viewpoint. We consider a basic routing game with two parallel routes
and an uncertain state that affects the travel cost on one of the routes. The authority
sends a noisy signal of the state to a given fraction of travelers. The information
structure (i.e., distribution of signals in each state) chosen by the authority creates a
heterogeneous information environment for the routing game. The solution concept
governing the travelers’ route choices is Bayesian Wardrop Equilibrium. We design
an information structure to minimize the average traffic spillover – the amount of
equilibrium route flow exceeding a certain threshold – on one of the routes. We
provide an analytical characterization of the optimal information structure for any
fraction of travelers receiving the signal. We find that it can achieve the minimum
spillover so long as the fraction of travelers receiving the signal is larger than a
threshold (smaller than 1).
1 INTRODUCTION
Today, travelers heavily rely on a variety of information sources in making their day-to-
day travel decisions. These sources range from public systems (radio broadcasts, road
message signs) to navigation apps installed on their mobile devices. One approach to
study the impact of traffic information on route choices and/or departure time decisions
of travelers (players) is to formulate and analyze a game-theoretic model under a fixed
information environment, which specifies the knowledge of individual travelers about the
uncertain network state (e.g., presence of incidents or capacity perturbations) and the
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equilibrium behavior of other travelers [1], [2], [3], [4]. This paper is motivated by the
need to extend this approach for designing an “optimal” information structure that can be
used to regulate traffic flows in a network with uncertain state. We adopt the viewpoint
of Bayesian persuasion and focus on identifying the distribution of information signal
(conditional on the state) to induce an equilibrium outcome that is close to a target flow
pattern which reflects the preference of a central authority (information designer).
Practically, our setup is motivated by the several concerns raised by city authorities
and residents of areas that have witnessed significant increase in traffic congestion in their
neighborhood streets due to route recommendations provided by the navigation apps [5],
[6], [7], [8]. In some cases, these routes pass through school areas, evacuation zones, con-
struction sites, or active incidents. Increased traffic through these regions naturally raises
noise and safety concerns. In other cases, recommended routes are often comprised of
secondary streets that were not designed for heavy and prolonged rush hour traffic. As
a result, these streets can witness deterioration in infrastructure condition, and further
decrease in their traffic carrying capacity. To address these concerns, cities and trans-
portation agencies – henceforth jointly referred as central authority – are now playing an
active role in communicating their preferred limits on the usage of neighborhood streets
to traffic information providers [9], [10]. This raises the question: How can the central
authority reduce traffic spillover (average flow exceeding a specific threshold) on certain
routes by designing the information environment faced by travelers?
We present a stylized model to address this question. Our model captures an important
(and practically relevant) feature of traffic information design: not all travelers can receive
the signal sent by the central authority. For example, some travelers may not have access
to or choose not to use the information signal. We capture this feature in a Bayesian
congestion game, where the heterogeneous information environment is determined not
only by the the signal sent by the central authority, but also due to the amount of travelers
with access to this signal. This game allows us to formulate and solve the information
design problem, in which the distribution of information signal is chosen by the central
authority to regulate the induced equilibrium traffic flows.
We consider a transportation network with two parallel routes, where one route is
prone to a random capacity-reducing event (incident), and the other is not. Incident
state results in increased travel cost on the first route. The cost of each route is an in-
creasing (affine) function of the flow on that route. The central authority (information
designer) knows the true state (i.e., whether or not the incident happened), and chooses
an information structure that is used to send the signal to a fraction of travelers. Travelers
are strategic in that they choose routes with the minimum expected cost based on their
information of the state. The induced route flow is a Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium cor-
responding to the information structure chosen by central authority. The objective of the
central authority is to minimize the average spillover (in Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium)
on a pre-selected route beyond a threshold flow.
Our solution approach to optimal information design is based on two key steps: First,
for any fraction and any (feasible) information structure, we characterize the unique equi-
librium route flow of the Bayesian routing game. We find that all feasible information
structures can be partitioned into two sets, each of which have qualitatively distinct im-
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pact on the equilibrium route flows (Proposition 1). Second, based on the analysis of
equilibrium route flows, we pose the problem of selecting the optimal information struc-
ture as an optimization problem, which is nonlinear and non-convex in the information
structure.
Still, we manage to analytically solve the abovementioned optimization problem. For
any fraction of travelers receiving the information signal, we fully characterize the optimal
information structure (Proposition 2, Theorem 1). We find that if when the probability
of the incident state is low, it is optimal not to provide any state information to travelers,
and the spillover is zero. On the other hand, when the probability of the incident state is
high, the optimal information structure depends on the fraction of travelers who receive
the signal. We show that given the optimal information structure, the spillover is positive
only in the incident state. Moreover, we find that the minimum average spillover can be
achieved by the optimal information structure as long as the fraction of travelers receiving
the signals exceeds a certain threshold fraction. Interestingly, this threshold fraction is
also the fraction that achieves the minimum equilibrium average cost of all travelers under
the optimal information structure (Proposition 3).
Our work contributes to the recent literature of information design. The papers [11]
and [12] focused on designing the optimal information structure that sends signals of
uncertain state to all travelers in order to minimize the overall traffic congestion (as
opposed to regulating traffic flows on selected route(s)). The ideas used in our approach
are related to the broader literature on Bayesian persuasion; see [13] for a comprehensive
review. Other relevant literature includes Bayesian persuasion with multiple receivers [14],
[15], and persuasion with private information [16]. The distinguishing aspects of our paper
are: (1) the objective of the central authority is to minimize the average traffic spillover on
chosen route, instead of average travel time; (2) travelers’ route choices are evaluated in
Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium under the heterogenous information environment created
by the information signal; (3) characterization of optimal information structure for any
fraction of travelers receiving the signal.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec. 2, we present our model of Bayesian
congestion game and formulate the information design problem. In Sec. 3, we characterize
equilibrium outcomes of the game under heterogeneous information environment created
by the signal sent to a fraction of travelers. Next, in Sec. 4, we present the optimal
information structure for any given spillover threshold and any fraction of travelers with
access to information signal. We analyze the impact of optimal information structure on
travelers’ costs in Sec. 5. Due to limited space, we do not present detailed proofs and
only discuss the key ideas behind our results.
2 Model
2.1 Network
Consider a traffic routing problem in which a single origin-destination pair is connected
by two parallel routes R = {r1, r2}. Non-atomic travelers (players) with total demand of
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D make route choices in the network.
The cost (travel time) of each route r ∈ R is an affine increasing function of the route
flow fr. Moreover, the cost function of r1 is affected by network state ω ∈ Ω ∆= {a,n},
which is uncertain. The cost function of r2 is state-independent. Particularly, the cost
functions are given by:
cω1 (f1) =
{
αa1f1 + b1, if ω = a,
αn1 f2 + b2, if ω = n,
c2(f2) = α2f2 + b2.
The state is drawn from a prior probability distribution θ, where θ(a) = p and θ(n) = 1−p.
In this model, state a (“accident”) corresponds to an incident on r1; and state n
(“nominal”) indicates no incident on r1. Route r2 is not prone to incidents. A practical
interpretation is that state a reduces the capacity of r1, and so it faces higher rate of
congestion as f1 increases (relative to state n), i.e. α
a
1 > α
n
1 . Additionally, state does not
impact the cost when there is no traffic, i.e. free-flow travel time b1 is not affected by the
presence of incident.
For ease of presentation, we assume that r1 is “shorter” than r2 in that its free-flow
travel time is smaller, i.e. b1 < b2. In addition, the rate of congestion in r1 is smaller than
r2 in state n, but larger in state a, i.e. α
a
1 > α2 > α
n
1 . To avoid triviality, we also assume
that the demand is sufficiently high so that players do not take one route exclusively:
D >
b2 − b1
αn1
. (1)
2.2 Information Structure and Traffic Flow Regulation
We introduce a central authority (city or transportation agency) who has complete knowl-
edge of the realized network state. This authority is an “information designer” in that she
has the ability to shape the players’ information about the state by way of sending them
a (noisy) signal s ∈ S ∆= {a,n}. For example, in the context of transportation systems,
the authority can influence players’ knowledge of route conditions through advanced trav-
eler information systems and/or navigation apps. The authority chooses an information
structure pi = (pi(s|ω))s∈S,ω∈Ω, where pi(s|ω) is the probability of sending signal s when
the state is ω. Let Π be the set of feasible information structures satisfying the following
constraints:
pi(s|ω) ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ S, and ∀ω ∈ Ω, (2a)∑
s∈S
pi(s|ω) = 1, ∀ω ∈ Ω, (2b)
pi(n|n) ≥ pi(n|a), (2c)
Constraints (2a) - (2b) ensure that (pi(a|ω), pi(n|ω)) is a feasible probability vector for
any ω ∈ Ω. Constraint (2c) ensures that the signal n is more likely to be sent in state n
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than in state a. Constraints (2b) and (2c) also imply that signal a is more likely to be
sent in state a than in state n, i.e. pi(a|a) ≥ pi(a|n). We use (2c) to avoid duplication of
equivalent information structures. Note that one information structure becomes another
equivalent structure by switching the signals a and n.
Furthermore, in practice, it is reasonable to expect that some players may not have
access to or choose not to use the signal sent by the authority. We refer the mass of
players who receive the signals as population 1, and the remaining players who do not
have access to signals as population 2. In our problem of optimal information design (Sec.
4), the fraction of population 1, denoted λ ∈ [0, 1], is taken as an exogenous parameter.
The routing strategy of population 1 is a function of the received signal, denoted
q1 = (q1r(s))r∈R,s∈S, where q
1
r(s) is the amount of population 1 players who take route r
when receiving the signal s. On the other hand, the routing strategy of population 2 can
be simply expressed by q2 = (q2r)r∈R, where q
2
r is the amount of population 2 players taking
route r. A strategy profile q
∆
= (q1, q2) is feasible if it satisfies the following constraints:∑
r∈R
q1r(s) = λD, ∀s ∈ S, (3a)∑
r∈R
q2r = (1− λ)D, (3b)
q1r(s) ≥ 0, q2r ≥ 0, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S. (3c)
We denote the feasible strategy set as Q. The vector of flow is f = (fr(s))r∈R,s∈S, where
fr(s) is the aggregate flow on route r when the signal is s:
fr(s) = q
1
r(s) + q
2, ∀r ∈ R, ∀s ∈ S. (4)
The loss function of the central authority is the average amount of traffic that exceeds
a given threshold (traffic spillover) on one of the two routes. The authority may select
the route(s) and threshold(s) for regulating traffic flows based on factors such as desirable
or enforced capacity limits and/or maximum admissible flow through various routes, to
limit direct impact (e.g., congestion) or indirect impact (e.g., noise or safety concerns) of
traffic flow. For ease of exposition, we define the loss function as the average spillover on
r2 given a fixed threshold τ on the route flow:
L(pi, f)
∆
=
∑
s∈S
P(s)(fr(s)− τ)+, (5)
where P(s) =
∑
ω∈Ω θ(ω)pi(s|ω) is the marginal probability with which the authority sends
signal s, and (f2(s) − τ)+ = max{f2(s) − τ, 0} is the amount of traffic that exceeds the
threshold τ on r2 when the signal is s. Our subsequent analysis can also be applied to
address the spillover on r1 and/or arrive at a trade-off between desirable flows on r1 and
r2.
2.3 Information Design Problem
We formulate our information design problem as a two stage game: In the first stage,
the central authority chooses the information structure pi, and sends the realized signal s
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to all population 1 players. The signal creates a heterogeneous information environment
among players since s is the private knowledge (type) of population 1. In the second
stage, players play a Bayesian routing game under the information environment created
by pi and s.
Given any information structure pi, we denote the subgame in the second stage as
G(pi). The common prior of G(pi) is the joint probability of the state and the signal,
denoted µ = (µ(ω, s))ω∈Ω,s∈S:
µ(ω, s) = θ(ω)pi(s|ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀s ∈ S. (6)
The belief of population 1 given the received signal s is βs = (βs(ω))ω∈Ω, where for any
ω ∈ Ω and any s ∈ S, βs(ω) is the posterior obtained from Bayes’ rule:
βs(ω) =
θ(ω)pi(s|ω)
θ(a)pi(s|a) + θ(n)pi(s|n) =
µ(ω, s)
P(s)
. (7)
Since pi satisfies (2c), we can check that βa(a) ≥ βn(a) and βn(n) ≥ βa(n), i.e. the belief
of state ω when receiving signal s = ω is higher than that with the other signal.
Given any feasible routing strategy profile q ∈ Q, the expected cost of each route
r ∈ R based on βs is as follows:
E1[cr(q)|s] =
∑
ω∈Ω
βs(ω)cωr (fr(s)), ∀s ∈ S,∀r ∈ R,
where f is the aggregate route flow as in (4).
Since population 2 does not have private information of the state, the expected cost
of each route r is obtained based on the common prior µ:
E2[cr(q)] =
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
s∈S
µ(ω, s)cωr (fr(s)), ∀r ∈ R.
For the subgame G(pi), a routing strategy profile q∗ is a Bayesian Wardrop equilibrium if
for any r, r′ ∈ R, and any s ∈ S:
q1∗r (s) > 0 ⇒ E1[cr(q∗)|s] ≤ E1[cr′(q∗)|s], (8a)
q2∗r > 0 ⇒ E2[cr(q∗)] ≤ E2[cr′(q∗)]. (8b)
A route flow vector f ∗ is an equilibrium route flow if it can be induced by an equilibrium
strategy profile q∗. We do not explicitly indicate the dependence of q∗ and f ∗ on pi for
notational convenience.
The design of optimal information structure pi∗ can be formulated as the following
optimization problem:
min
pi
L(pi, f ∗)
s.t. pi satisfies (2), (9)
f ∗ is an equilibrium route flow vector in G(pi).
Formally, the tuple (pi∗, q∗) is a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the two-stage
game if:
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- Given any information structure pi, the routing strategy q∗ is a Bayesian Wardrop
equilibrium of the subgame G(pi), i.e. q∗ satisfies (8).
- The optimal information structure pi∗ minimizes the average traffic spillover given
the correponding equilibrium route flow, i.e. pi∗ is the optimal solution of (9).
3 Bayesian Wardrop Equilibrium
To solve for the optimal information structure, we first need to analyze players’ equilibrium
routing decisions in any subgame G(pi).
The following result parametrically characterizes the unique equilibrium route flow
vector in G(pi) for any λ ∈ [0, 1]. In this result, we show that given any information
structure pi, the properties of f ∗ depends on the relative size between λ and the value of
a function g : pi → [0, 1] defined as follows:
g(pi)
∆
=
α2D + b2 − b1
(α¯1(βn) + α2)D
− α2D + b2 − b1
(α¯1(βa) + α2)D
, (10)
where α¯1(β
s) = αa1β
s(a) + αn1β
s(n), and the beliefs (βs(ω))ω∈Ω are calculated as in (7).
Since we consider two routes, and the central authority aims at minimizing the traffic
spillover on r2, we only present the equilibrium route flow on r2. The flow on r1 is
f ∗1 (s) = D − f ∗2 (s) for any s ∈ S.
Proposition 1. For any pi and λ, the equilibrium route flow is unique and satisfies the
following properties:
- [g(pi) ≥ λ.] Population 1 exclusively takes r1 when they receive signal n, and r2 with
signal a; population 2 splits on the two routes. The flow on r2 is:
f∗2 (n) = D −
α2D + b2 − b1 + λDPr(a) (α¯1(βa) + α2)
α¯1(θ) + α2
(11a)
f∗2 (a) = f
∗
2 (n) + λD, (11b)
where α¯1(θ) = pα
a
1 + (1− p)αn1 .
- [g(pi) < λ.] Both populations split on the two routes. The flow on r2 is:
f ∗2 (n) = D −
α2D + b2 − b1
α¯1(βn) + α2
, (12a)
f ∗2 (a) = D −
α2D + b2 − b1
α¯1(βa) + α2
. (12b)
The idea of the proof follows Theorem 1 of [17] and Theorem 1-2 in [3].
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We now discuss the impact of information structure on the equilibrium route flows.
Given any fraction λ, the set of feasible information structures can be partitioned into
two sets as follows:
Π1
∆
= {Π|g(pi) ≥ λ} , Π2 ∆= {Π|g(pi) < λ} . (13)
Proposition 1 shows that the impact of pi on f ∗ for the case when pi ∈ Π1 is distinct from
pi ∈ Π2:
For pi ∈ Π1, all players in population 1 deviate from choosing r1 to r2 when the received
signal changes from n to a. From (11), the change of flow on r2 induced by the change
of signal is f ∗2 (a) − f ∗2 (n) = λD, which does not depend on the information structure pi.
Moreover, as λ increases, f ∗2 (n) decreases and f
∗
2 (a) increases.
For pi ∈ Π2, both populations split on the two routes. From (12), the change of flow
on r2 induced by the change of signal is f
∗
2 (a)− f ∗2 (n) = g(pi). The value of g(pi) in (10)
increases in βa(a) − βn(a), which evaluates the relative difference between the beliefs of
state a given the two signals.
Furthermore, for any pi ∈ Π2, the equilibrium route flows in (12) do not change with
λ. This implies that any equilibrium outcome when only λ fraction of players receive
signal s according to pi ∈ Π2 is equivalent to the case where all players receive the signal.
This property will be used in Sec. 4 for identifying an interval of λ, for which the optimal
information structure and the equilibrium outcome do not depend on λ.
Finally, note that the information structure pi affects the value of g(pi) in (10), and the
equilibrium route flows in (11) - (12) through the beliefs and the probability of signals
defined as follows:
β
∆
= (βa, βn), P
∆
= (Pr(a),Pr(n)).
Then, we can re-write L(pi, f ∗) in (5) as a function of (β,P), denoted L¯(β,P), and g(pi) as
a a function of β, denoted g¯(β). The characterization of how the equilibrium route flow
depends on (β,P) and the fraction λ is crucial for our approach for solving the optimal
information design problem in the next section.
4 Optimal Information Design
In this section, we present the optimal information structure pi∗, and analyze how pi∗
changes with the fraction λ and the flow threshold τ .
Due to the space limit, we only present the optimal information structure for cases
where the threshold τ satisfies the following constraint:
D − α2D + b2 − b1
αn1 + α2
≤ τ ≤ D − α2D + b2 − b1
αa1 + α2
. (14)
The lower (resp. upper) bound of τ is the equilibrium route flow on r2 when all players have
complete information of the state n (resp. a). Therefore, (14) means that in complete
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information environment, the spillover is positive in state a, but zero in state n. Our
solution approach can be easily extended to the cases where τ is outside of this range.
We first obtain that if the prior probability of state a is low, then the optimal infor-
mation structure is to provide no information of the state.
Proposition 2. If p ≤ p¯, where
p¯ =
1
αa1 − αn1
(
α2D + b2 − b1
D − τ − α2 − α
n
1
)
,
then the optimal information structure is to provide no information of the state, i.e.
pi∗(s|ω) = P(s) for any s ∈ S and ω ∈ Ω. The average traffic spillover is L(pi∗, f ∗) = 0.
From Proposition 1, we know that if pi∗ does not provide state information, then
g(pi∗) = 0, and the equilibrium route flow is as follows:
f ∗2 (s) = D −
α2D + b2 − b1
α¯1(θ) + α2
, ∀s ∈ S. (15)
The value of p¯ is the threshold of p such that f ∗2 (s) in (15) equals to τ . For any p ≤ p¯,
f ∗2 (s) ≤ τ . Therefore, the objective function in (9) is zero (attains the minimum) when
the information structure provides no information of the state. From (14), we know that
p¯ ∈ [0, 1].
For p > p¯, based on Proposition 1, we can restate the optimal information design
problem (9) as the following optimization problem:
min
pi
L(pi, f ∗) =
∑
s∈S
Pr(s)(f ∗2 (s)− τ)+,
s.t.
f ∗2 is in (11), if g(pi) ≥ λ,
f ∗2 is in (12), if g(pi) < λ,
pi satisfies (2),
(16)
where g(pi) is given by (10).
The optimization problem (16) is non-linear and non-convex in the information struc-
ture pi. The key difficulties in solving (16) are: (i) the value of g(pi), and the equilibrium
route flows f ∗2 are nonlinear functions of (β,P), which are again nonlinear functions of pi;
(ii) the expressions of the equilibrium route flows are different for information structures
in Π1 and Π2; (iii) the objective function is a piece-wise linear (instead of linear) function
of the equilibrium route flows.
We develop an approach to tackle these difficulties and solve the optimal information
structure analytically: First, we characterize the set of (β,P) induced by information
structure pi satisfying (2), which can be used to construct another optimization problem
to solve the optimal (β∗,P∗) directly (Lemma 1). Second, we identify the range of λ
in which the optimal information structure satisfies pi∗ ∈ Π1, and the equilibrium route
flow is given by (11) (Lemma 2). Third, we prove that the equilibrium flow on r2 under
optimal information structure is no less than τ ; thus L(pi, f ∗) is equivalent to a linear
function of f ∗ (Lemma 3).
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Lemma 1. A tuple (β,P) can be induced by a feasible information structure pi if and only
if (β,P) satisfies:
βa(a) · Pr(a) + βn(a) · Pr(n) = p, (17a)
βa(a) ≥ βn(a), (17b)
βa(n) + βa(a) = 1, βa(a), βa(n) ≥ 0, (17c)
βn(n) + βn(a) = 1, βn(n), βn(a) ≥ 0, (17d)
Pr(a) + Pr(n) = 1, Pr(a),Pr(n) ≥ 0. (17e)
The idea of the proof follows Proposition 1 in [18].
Constraint (17a) ensures that β is derived from θ and pi as in (7). Constraint (17b)
results from (2c) to exclude beliefs that are induced by equivalent information structures.
Constraints (17c) – (17e) ensure that β and P are feasible probability vectors.
Based on Lemma 1 and following (16), we can solve for the optimal (β∗,P∗) from the
following optimization problem:
min
β,P
L¯(β,P) =
∑
s∈S
Pr(s)(f ∗2 (s)− τ)+,
s.t.
f ∗2 is in (11), if g¯(β) ≥ λ,
f ∗2 is in (12), if g¯(β) < λ,
(β,P) satisfies (17),
(18)
where g¯(β) is a function of β as in (10). We use both (16) and (18) for designing the
optimal information structure.
Next, we identify a threshold λ¯ ∈ (0, 1) as follows:
λ¯ = 1− α2D + b2 − b1
(αa1 + α2)D
− τ
D
. (19)
Lemma 2. For any p > p¯, and any λ < λ¯, the optimal information structure pi∗ ∈ Π1,
i.e. g(pi∗) ≥ λ, where g(pi∗) is in (10). The equilibrium route flow is given by (11).
Furthermore, we show that given the optimal information structure, f ∗2 (s) is no less
than the threshold τ for any s ∈ S.
Lemma 3. For any p > p¯ and any λ ∈ [0, 1], the equilibrium route flows induced by the
optimal information structure must satisfy f ∗2 (s) ≥ τ for any s ∈ S.
Lemma 3 shows that the objective function in (16) can be simplified as a linear function
of f ∗:
L(pi, f ∗) = P(a)(f ∗2 (a)− τ) + P(n)(f ∗2 (n)− τ)
= P(a)f ∗2 (a) + P(n)f
∗
2 (n)− τ. (20)
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We are now ready to derive the optimal information structure pi∗. We find that pi∗ is
different for λ in three regimes: Λ1 : λ ∈ [0, λ); Λ2 : λ ∈ [λ, λ¯), and Λ3 : λ ∈ [λ¯, 1]. The
threshold λ is given by:
λ =
(D − τ) (α¯1(θ) + α2)− α2D − b2 + b1
Dp(αa1 + α2)
, (21)
and λ¯ is given by (19). Since τ satisfies (14) and p > p¯, we can check that 0 < λ < λ¯ < 1.
Therefore, the three regimes are well-defined intervals of λ.
Based on Proposition 1 and Lemmas 1 – 3, we characterize the optimal information
structure in each regime. We also present the equilibrium route flow and the average
traffic spillover in each regime.
Theorem 1. For any p > p¯,
In regime Λ1, the optimal information structure is:
pi∗(a|n) = 0, pi∗(n|n) = 1, (22a)
pi∗(a|a) = 1, pi∗(n|a) = 0. (22b)
The equilibrium route flow is:
f ∗2 (n) = D −
α2D + b2 − b1 + λDp(αa1 + α2)
α¯1(θ) + α2
f ∗2 (a) = f
∗
2 (n) + λD.
The average traffic spillover decreases in λ:
L(pi∗, f∗) = D − τ − α2D + b2 − b1
α¯1(θ) + α2
− p(1− p)(α
a
1 − αn1 )λD
α¯1(θ) + α2
.
In regime Λ2, the optimal information structure is:
pi∗(a|n) = 0, pi∗(n|n) = 1, (23a)
pi∗(a|a) = (D − τ)(α¯1(θ) + α2)− α2D − b2 + b1
λD(αa1 + α2)p
, (23b)
pi∗(n|a) = 1− pi∗(a|a). (23c)
The equilibrium route flow is:
f ∗2 (n) = τ, f
∗
2 (a) = τ + λD.
The average traffic spillover does not change with λ:
L(pi∗, f∗) =
(D − τ)(α¯1(θ) + α2)− α2D − b2 + b1
αa1 + α2
. (24)
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In regime Λ3, the optimal information structure is:
pi∗(a|n) = 0, pi∗(n|n) = 1, (25a)
pi∗(a|a) = (D − τ)(α¯1(θ) + α2)− α2D − b2 + b1
((D − τ)(αa1 + α2)− α2D − b2 + b1) p
, (25b)
pi∗(n|a) = 1− pi∗(a|a). (25c)
The equilibrium route flow is:
f ∗2 (n) = τ, f
∗
2 (a) = D −
α2D + b2 − b1
αa1 + α2
. (26a)
The average traffic spillover L(pi∗, f ∗) is as in (24).
Now we discuss the properties of optimal information structure in detail. Firstly, in
state n, the signal provides complete state information, i.e. pi∗(n|n) = 1. This is because
when the cost on r1 is low in state n, sending signal a will unnecessarily increase the
traffic spillover on r2. In state a, the signal provides complete state information when
the fraction of population 1 is smaller than λ, but only provides partial state information
(pi∗(a|a) < 1) if λ > λ to avoid sending large flow to r2.
Secondly, the average spillover decreases with λ in regime Λ1 (λ < λ), and does not
change with λ in regimes Λ2 and Λ3 (λ ≥ λ). This implies that the minimum average traffic
spillover can be achieved by the optimal information structure as long as the fraction of
travelers receiving the signal exceeds the threshold λ, which is smaller than 1. Moreover,
if λ ≥ λ, then the spillover is only positive in state a, i.e. traffic flow on r2 only exceeds
the threshold flow τ if there is an incident. The probability of positive spillover with
optimal information structure (µ∗(a, a) = pi∗(a|a) · p) is smaller than that in the case
where players have no state information (the spillover probability is 1) and the case where
players have complete state information (the spillover probability is p).
Thirdly, λ¯ is the threshold fraction beyond which the optimal information structure
pi∗ and the equilibrium route flow f ∗ do not depend on λ. Additionally, λ¯ is the maximum
impact of the signal on route flows, i.e. the maximum fraction of travelers who change
routing decisions with the received signals. For any λ ≤ λ¯, pi∗ ∈ Π1 and the signal
influences the routing decisions of all travelers in population 1 (λ < λ¯ fraction). On the
other hand, for any λ > λ¯, pi∗ ∈ Π2. Then, regardless of the fraction of population 1, λ¯
fraction of travelers change their routing decisions with the signal.
Finally, we find that the regime boundaries λ and λ¯ in (21) and (19) decrease as
τ increases. Practically, this implies that if more traffic can be routed on r2 (i.e. τ is
larger), then the minimum average spillover can be achieved by sending signals to a smaller
fraction of players (λ) according to the optimal information structure. Additionally, the
maximum fraction of players who change routing decisions with the received signals (λ¯)
is also smaller.
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5 Impact of information design on travel costs
We now analyze how the optimal information structure designed for minimizing the
spillover affects the players’ cost (both individual and social) in equilibrium.
We define equilibrium population costs as the average travel time costs experienced
by players in each population in equilibrium: C1∗ = 1
λD
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
s∈S c
ω
r (f
∗
r (s)) · q1∗r (s) and
C2∗ = 1
(1−λ)D
∑
ω∈Ω
∑
s∈S c
ω
r (f
∗
r (s)) · q2∗r . We define the equilibrium average cost of all
players as C∗ = λC1∗ + (1− λ)C2∗.
For any p ≤ p¯, we know from Proposition 2 that the optimal information structure
provides no state information to players. Hence, the information structure has no impact
on the players’ equilibrium costs.
For any p > p¯, we can compute the equilibrium population costs and the equilibrium
average cost based on Proposition 1 and Theorem 1.
Proposition 3. Given the optimal information structure pi∗, C1∗ ≤ C2∗ if λ ∈ [0, λ¯),
and C1∗ = C2∗ if λ ∈ [λ¯, 1]. Furthermore, as λ increases, C∗ monotonically decreases in
regime Λ1, increases in regime Λ2, does not change in regime Λ3. 
Proposition 3 shows that the signal sent by the central authority gives players in
population 1 an advantage over population 2 in terms of the average costs if λ < λ¯, and
the two populations experience the same cost if λ ≥ λ¯. Furthermore, Theorem 1 and
Proposition 3 show that in regime Λ1, increasing λ reduces both the traffic spillover on
r2 and the equilibrium average cost. However, if λ increases beyond λ, then the average
cost increases, while the average spillover does not change.
One can interpret these insights in the context of two practical situations – the fraction
λ is induced by players’ choice of accessing to the signal versus chosen by the designer
versus. In both situations, the average traffic spillover is the same.
If players can choose whether or not to get access to signals – the information, then the
fraction of population 1 will be higher or equal to λ¯. This is because players in population
2 will continue to switch to population 1 until the costs of two populations are the same.
Hence, the optimal information structure pi∗ is given by (25).
On the other hand, if the designer can choose the fraction λ as well as the information
structure pi, then it is optimal for the authority to provide complete state information
as in (22) to λ fraction of players in order to achieve the minimum average spillover and
the minimum average cost. However, in this case, C1∗ < C2∗. Therefore, the resulting
information structure favors the set of players who receive the signals.
We illustrate our results in the following example.
Example 1. The cost functions of the network are ca1(f1) = 3f1+15, c
n
1 (f1) = f1+15, and
c2(f2) = 2f2 + 20. The total demand D = 10, and the threshold τ = 2.5. The probability
of state a is p = 0.3. From (21) and (19), the thresholds are λ = 0.133, and λ¯ = 0.25.
Fig. 1a shows pi∗(a|a) for λ ∈ [0, 1]. Fig. 1b shows the resulting equilibrium cost
of each population. Fig. 1c and Fig. 1d compare the average traffic spillover and the
equilibrium average cost under the optimal information structure with the corresponding
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costs in two situations: (1) the central authority provides no information to players; (2)
complete information of the state is provided to λ fraction of players.
In this example, the minimum average spillover can be achieved as long as more than
13.3% of players have access to the signal (Fig. 1c). If the fraction increases over 25%,
then the optimal information design does not depend on λ (Fig. 1a). Moreover, the
optimal information structure achieves 18% lower spillover in comparison to the case
of no information, and 47% lower spillover in comparison to providing complete state
information to all players. This demonstrates that the central authority achieves non-
trivial reduction in average spillover by optimal information design even when a high
fraction of players do not have access to the information signal.
Additionally, Fig. 1b shows that in this example population 1 enjoys reduction of
cost by 7% compared with population 2 if λ = λ, which is the fraction that minimizes
the average spillover and the average cost. Finally, from Fig. (1d), we see that the
equilibrium average cost under optimal information structure is lower than that in the
case with no state information, but the minimum cost under optimal information structure
(when λ = λ) is slightly (1%) higher than the minimum cost in the case where the signal
provides complete state information.
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Figure 1: Congestion costs under optimal information structure: (a) Probability of acci-
dent signal in state a; (b) Equilibrium population costs; (c) Average spillover on r2; (d)
Equilibrium average cost.
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6 Concluding Remarks
Our work studies the problem of information design for a central authority who aims to
reduce traffic spillover on certain routes in a transportation network with uncertain states.
Importantly, our model addresses the practical situation where only a fraction of players
have access to the state information sent by the authority. We present an approach to
analyze players’ equilibrium routing strategies in heterogeneous information environment,
and characterize the optimal information structure given any fraction of players receiv-
ing the signal. Our results suggest that the minimum spillover can be achieved by the
optimal information design without ensuring that the signal is received by all players.
We are interested in extending our results to networks with multiple routes and multiple
states. We are also interested in investigating the tradeoff between regulating spillover
and reducing average cost.
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